Legal

Alcune riflessioni sui Redditi da Mining da parte di Persone Fisiche.

La qualificazione giuridica del mining è un grattacapo.

Il mining è un’attività di validazione di dati, o meglio una sfida a trovare un determinato valore di hash attraverso un “nonce”, numero casuale.

Chi risolve detta “sfida”, si vede attribuita una determinata quantità di bitcoin.

Esulando da considerazioni relative a attività di mining svolta in forma di impresa, la questione si pone qualora una persona fisica svolga detta attività a titolo “privato” o partecipando ad una “mining pool“.

Gli eventuali redditi, sono tassabili o no?

Un’ipotesi di lavoro si trova nell’art. 67 del TUIR, nella parte in cui si può individuare quale reddito diverso:

d) le vincite delle lotterie, dei concorsi a premio, dei giochi e delle scommesse organizzati per il pubblico e i premi derivanti da prove di abilita’ o dalla sorte nonche’ quelli attribuiti in riconoscimento di particolari meriti artistici, scientifici o sociali;

Dato che l’attività del “miner” consiste in un premio derivante da una prova di abilità o dalla sorte (capacità di calcolo più sorte di individuare il “nonce”), potrebbero essere attratti da tale lettera d).

Tale configurazione determina l’applicazione dell’art. 69 del TUIR:

1. Fatte salve le disposizioni di cui al comma 1-bis, i premi e le vincite di cui alla lettera d) del comma l dell’articolo 67 costituiscono reddito per l’intero ammontare percepito nel periodo di imposta, senza alcuna deduzione.

In tal caso nessun costo è ammesso in deduzione e viene assoggettato a tassazione l’intero importo.

L’alternativa è rinvenibile sempre nello stesso articolo 67:
i) i redditi derivanti da attivita’ commerciali non esercitate abitualmente;

l) i redditi derivanti da attivita’ di lavoro autonomo non esercitate abitualmente o dalla assunzione di obblighi di fare, non fare o permettere;

Tale soluzione lascia interrogativi aperti non risolvibili:

  1. La qualificazione quale attività commerciale o di lavoro autonomo presuppone un sinallagma, una relazione tra investimenti e ricavi, che in tale caso sono aleatori e non è possibile identificarla.
  2. Tale attività commerciale o di lavoro autonomo non potrebbe mai essere “non abituale”, dato che l’organizzazione di hardware e macchine, nonché di software dedicato, rendono non possibile tale attività in forma “non abituale”.

 

 

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the assessment of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing

European Commission released COM(2017) 340 final on 26.6.2017, the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the assessment of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border activities.

The Report classifies risks (threats and vulnerabilities) on various products with a rating on a scale from 1 to 4 as follows:

1) Lowly significant (value: 1)

2) Moderately significant (value: 2)

3) Significant (value: 3)

4) Very significant (value: 4)

The result for Virtual currencies are:

Threat

Terrorist financing

Conclusions: LEAs have gathered some information according to which terrorist groups may use virtual currencies to finance terrorist activities. However, the use of virtual currencies requires technical expertise which makes it less attractive. Consequently, the level of TF threat related to virtual currencies is considered as moderately significant(level 2).

Money laundering

Conclusions: few investigations have been conducted on virtual currencies which seem to be rarely used by criminal organisations. While they may have a high intent to use due to VCs characteristics (anonymity in particular), the level of capability is lower due to high technology required. Consequently, the level of ML threat related to virtual currencies is considered as moderately significant (level 2).

Vulnerability

Terrorist financing

The assessment of the TF vulnerability related to virtual currencies providers shall take into account the fact that, currently, virtual currencies are not regulated in the EU and that the risks of being misused for TF purposes are only just emerging.

Conclusions: the most important element of vulnerability for virtual currencies providers is the fact that there are not regulated in the EU. They cannot be properly monitored and they cannot report suspicious transactions to FIU. The inherent risk exposure is also very high due to the features of the virtual currencies (internet, cross-border and anonymity). Finally, the sector is currently not organised well enough to receive guidance or relevant information on AML/CFT requirements. Consequently, the level of TF vulnerabilities related to virtual currencies is considered as significant/very significant (level 3/4).

Money laundering

Conclusions: the assessment of ML vulnerability presents commonalities with TF. The most important element of vulnerability for virtual currencies providers is the fact that there are not regulated in the EU. They cannot be properly monitored and they cannot report suspicious transactions to FIUs. The inherent risk exposure is also very high due to the features of the virtual currencies (internet, cross-border and anonymity). Finally, the sector is currently not organised well enough to receive guidance or relevant information on AML/CFT requirements. In that context, the level of TF vulnerabilities related to virtual currencies is considered as significant/very significant (level 3/4).

Mitigating measures

The Commission proposed in its proposal for amending Directive (UE) 2015/849 that virtual currency exchange platforms as well as custodian wallet providers are added to the list of obliged entities under 4AMLD.

The Commission would issue a report to be accompanied, if necessary, by proposals, including, where appropriate, with respect to virtual currencies, empowerments to set-up and maintain a central database registering users’ identities and wallet addresses accessible to FIUs, as well as self-declaration forms for the use of virtual currency users.

The Commission will continue to monitor in the context of the SNRA the risks posed by FinTech/RegTech, crypto-to-crypto currency exchanges, and use of virtual currencies for purchasing of high value goods.

I suggest to read the whole report to acknowledge risks about methodology and global analysis.

I regret for some commentators that bitcoin are not used for terrorism financing and/or money laundering, but cryptocurrencies are not useful for money laundering by design.

The methodology is the following:

Table 2: the threat component (money laundering risks) will be assessed according to a four scale threat level:

LOWLY SIGNIFICANT

(value: 1)

No indicators that criminals have the intention to exploit this modus operandi for ML/TF. The modus operandi is extremely difficult to access and/or may cost more than other options and perceived as unattractive and/or highly insecure. No indicators that criminals have the necessary capabilities to exploit this modus operandi. The use of this modus operandi requires sophisticated planning, knowledge and/or high technical expertise than other options. The threat related to the use of this modus operandi is lowly significant.
MODERATELY SIGNIFICANT

(value: 2)

Criminals may have vague intentions to exploit this modus operandi for ML/TF. The modus operandi is difficult to access and/or may cost more than other options and perceived as unattractive and/or insecure. Few indicators that criminals have some of the necessary capabilities to exploit this modus operandi. The use of this modus operandi requires planning, knowledge and/or technical expertise than other options. The threat related to the use of this modus operandi is moderately significant.
SIGNIFICANT

(value: 3)

Criminals have exploited this modus operandi for ML/TF. The modus operandi is accessible and/or represents a financially viable option. The modus operandi is perceived as rather attractive and/or fairly secure. Criminals have the necessary capabilities to exploit this modus operandi. The modus operandi requires moderate levels of planning, knowledge and/or technical expertise. The threat related to the use of this modus operandi is significant.
VERY SIGNIFICANT

(value: 4)

Criminals have recurrently exploited this modus operandi for ML/TF. The modus operandi is widely accessible and available via a number of means and/or relatively low cost. The modus operandi is perceived as attractive and/or secure. Criminals are known to have the necessary capabilities. The modus operandi is relatively easy to abuse, requires little planning, knowledge and/or technical expertise required compared to other options. The threat related to the use of this modus operandi is very significant.

Table 4: The vulnerability component will be assessed according to a four scale vulnerability level:

LOWLY SIGNIFICANT(value: 1) [Within the sector/area considered, deterrence measures and controls exist and are effective at deterring money laundering and financing terrorism. The sector shows a positive organisational framework and a negligible exposure to the risk of ML/TF].

Illustrative assessment criteria:

RISK EXPOSURE

– No or very limited products, services or transactions that facilitate speedy or anonymous transactions; secured and/or monitored delivery channels; low level of financial transactions; low level of cash based transactions; high quality management of new technologies and/or new payment methods

– Very limited volume of higher risk customers; high ability to manage corporate entities or trusts in customer relationships

– No or very limited business and customer based in areas identified as high risk; low level of cross-border movements of funds;

AWARNESS OF THE RISK VULNERABILITY

– Sector concerned shows a satisfactory level of awareness of the ML/TF risks inherent to its sector (evidence based, actions undertaken, training, allocated resources). The sector benefits from a positive organisational framework.

– Competent authorities provide a comprehensive ML/TF risk assessment related to the sector and LEAs have a high ability to counter ML/TF risks (a range of ML/TF cases is visible and highly likely to be detected, leading to investigation, prosecution and convictions)

– Good ability of the FIU to detect and analyse the risks, to ensure a good functioning of gathering information through STR, in particular through the use of tailor-made indicators and a sufficient amount of resources to actually perform the risk-analysis.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTROLS

– The existing legal framework is commensurate to the risks inherent to this sector.

– Controls [defined by the legislation] are effectively applied by the sector. Reliable CDD/identification mechanisms are in place to ensure adequate identification and verification process of a customer. Internal controls are applied by obliged entities in a robust manner (e.g. risk management, record keeping, training). Obliged entities are effectively reporting suspicious transactions to FIUs.

– Domestic and international cooperation between AML authorities, in particular FIUs and supervisory authorities, allows a good level of sharing of information

=> Lowly-significant vulnerabilities.

MODERATELY SIGNIFICANT

(value: 2)

[Within the sector/area considered, deterrence measures and controls exist and are reasonably effective at deterring money laundering and financing terrorism. The sector shows an organisational framework presenting some weaknesses and/or an exposure to the risk of ML/TF.].

Illustrative assessment criteria:

RISK EXPOSURE

– Limited products, services and transactions that facilitate speedy or anonymous transactions; mostly secured and/or monitored delivery channels; rather significant level of financial transactions; rather significant cash based transactions; good management of new technologies and/or new payment methods

– Few higher risk customers; good ability to manage corporate entities or trusts in customer relationships

– Some business and customer are based in areas identified as high risk; rather significant level of cross-border movements of funds;

AWARNESS OF THE RISK VULNERABILITY

– Sector concerned shows some awareness of the ML/TF risks inherent to its sector (evidence based, actions undertaken, training, allocated resources). The sector benefits from an organisational framework which shows some weaknesses.

– Competent authorities provide a reasonable ML/TF risk assessment related to the sector and LEAs have a good ability to counter ML/TF risks (a range of ML/TF cases is visible and likely to be detected, leading to some investigations, prosecutions and convictions

– FIU can detect and analyse the risks in certain circumstances, to ensure a good functioning of gathering information through STR, in particular through the use of tailor-made indicators

LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTROLS

– The existing legal framework covers in major parts the risks inherent to this sector

– Controls [defined by the legislation] are applied by the sector but presenting some weaknesses. Reliable CDD/identification mechanisms are in place but do not ensure systematically an adequate identification and verification process of a customer. Internal controls are applied by obliged entities to some extent (e.g. risk management, record keeping, training). Obliged entities are reporting few suspicious transactions to FIUs.

– Domestic and international cooperation between AML authorities, in particular FIUs and supervisory authorities, allows a partial sharing of information.

=> moderately significant vulnerabilities

SIGNIFICANT

(value: 3)

[Within the sector/area considered, deterrence measures and controls have limited effects in deterring criminal/terrorist abuse of the service. The sector shows an organisational framework presenting very significant weaknesses and/or a significant exposure to the risk of ML/TF.].

Illustrative assessment criteria:

RISK EXPOSURE

– Significant volumes of products, services and transactions that facilitate speedy or anonymous transactions; few secured and/or monitored delivery channels; significant level of financial transactions; significant cash based transactions; low management of new technologies and/or new payment methods

– Significant volumes of higher risk customers; low ability to manage corporate entities or trusts in customer relationships

– Major part of business and customer is based in areas identified as high risk; significant level of cross-border movements of funds;

AWARNESS OF THE RISK VULNERABILITY

– Sector concerned shows limited awareness of the ML/TF risks inherent to its sector (evidence based, actions undertaken, and training, allocated resources). The sector benefits from a limited organisational framework.

– Competent authorities provide for a limited ML/TF risk assessment to the sector and LEAs have low capacity to counter ML/TF risks (only some ML/TF cases are visible and unlikely to be detected, leading to few investigations, prosecutions and convictions)

– The FIU can detect and analyse the risks only in limited circumstances which allows only a limited functioning of gathering information through STR.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTROLS

– The existing legal framework does not cover the most substantial parts of the risks inherent to this sector.

– Controls applied by the sector present significant weaknesses. Few reliable CDD/identification mechanisms are in place and does not allow an effective identification and verification process of a customer. Internal controls are applied by obliged entities with very significant weaknesses (e.g. risk management, record keeping, training). Obliged entities are reporting very few suspicious transactions to FIUs.

– Domestic and international cooperation between AML authorities, in particular FIUs and supervisory authorities, allows on few possibilities of sharing of information

=> Significant vulnerabilities

VERY SIGNIFICANT(value: 4) [Within the sector/area considered, there are extremely limited or no measures and controls in place, or they are not working as intended. The sector shows an organisational framework presenting highly significant weakness and/or a high exposure to the risk of ML/TF].

Illustrative assessment criteria:

RISK EXPOSURE

– Very significant volumes of products, services and transactions that facilitate speedy or anonymous transactions; no secured and/or monitored delivery channels; very significant level of financial transactions; very significant cash based transactions; no management of new technologies and/or new payment methods

– Very significant volumes of higher risk customers; no ability to manage corporate entities or trusts in customer relationships

– Business and customer are based in areas identified as high risk; very significant level of cross-border movements of funds;

AWARNESS OF THE RISK VULNERABILITY

– Sector concerned shows no awareness of the ML/TF risks inherent to its sector (evidence based, actions undertaken, training, allocated resources). The sector has no adequate organisational framework to address the ML/TF risks.

– Competent authorities don’t provide for any ML/TF risks assessment to the sector and LEAs have no ability to counter ML/TF risks (detection is very difficult and there are very few/no financial or other indicators of suspicious activity. The level of investigations, prosecutions and confiscations is extremely low)

– The FIU can detect the risks in very limited circumstances or in no circumstances.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTROLS

– The existing legal framework does not cover the risks inherent to this sector

– Controls applied by the sector present very significant weaknesses. No reliable CDD/identification mechanisms are in place and the basic identification and verification requirement process of a customer is not fulfilled. Internal controls are not properly applied by obliged entities (e.g. risk management, record keeping, training). Obliged entities are not reporting suspicious transactions to FIUs.

– Domestic and international cooperation between AML authorities, in particular FIUs and supervisory authorities, does not exist or does not allow sharing of information

=> very significant vulnerabilities

 

SNRApartI.pdf

COM2017-340_Document.pdf

La tassazione dei redditi prodotti in bitcoin (e in valute virtuali)

Il boom del mercato delle valute virtuali ha attratto numerosi contribuenti italiani. Alcuni di loro hanno realizzato ingenti plusvalenze e si rivolgono agli studi professionali dei commercialisti in cerca di risposte in merito al trattamento fiscale dei redditi prodotti. Nel totale vuoto normativo di una fattispecie tanto innovativa, proviamo a fare chiarezza…

http://www.mysolution.it/fisco/approfondimenti/commenti/2017/06/commento-30-giugno-2017-n.-1220/

di Paolo Luigi Burlone

per www.mysolution.it

New AML Law In Italy With New Rules On Bitcoin Exchangers. Post on Coinidol.

he AML4 (Directive 2015/859 UE) was introduced in Italy with its publication in the Italian Official Journal of the Legislative Decree 25th  May 2017, n. 90 (G.U. n. 140 of 19th June 2017) with the total reform of the legislative decree 231/2007.

The European Parliament has not yet approved the modification of AML4 with provisions regarding virtual currency (which will probably occur after discussion in plenary in late October 2017) but Italy anticipates some provisions, including Exchanger as an obliged entity for AML purposes.

[continue on https://coinidol.com/aml-law-in-italy-with-rules-on-exchangers/]

Consultazione Normativa Antiriciclaggio – contributo COINLEX.

In allegato il documento inviato da Coinlex. al Dipartimento del Tesoro relativo alla “Consultazione pubblica per l’attuazione della direttiva (UE) 2015/849 del Parlamento Europeo e del Consiglio, relativa alla prevenzione dell’uso del sistema finanziario a scopo di riciclaggio dei proventi di attività criminose e di finanziamento del terrorismo e recante modifica delle direttive 2005/60/CE e 2006/70/CE) e l’attuazione del regolamento (UE) 2015/847 del Parlamento Europeo e del Consiglio riguardante i dati informativi che accompagnano i trasferimenti di fondi e che abroga il regolamento (CE) 1781/2006”, [WBM] consultazione che poi ha portato all’emanazione del Decreto Legislativo 25 maggio 2017, n. 90 (G.U. n. 140 del 19 giugno 2017).

FileCOINLEX_ConsultazioneDTTesoro-AML4.pdf

Nuova normativa antiriciclaggio e CambiaValute Virtuali.

La IV Direttiva antiriciclaggio (Direttiva UE 2015/859) è stato introdotta in Italia con la pubblicazione sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale Italiana del Decreto Legislativo 25 maggio 2017, n. 90 (G.U. n. 140 del 19 giugno 2017) con la riscrittura totale del Decreto Legislativo 231/2007 ed entrata in vigore il 4 luglio 2017..

Nonostante il Parlamento Europeo non abbia ancora approvato la proposta di modifica della IV Direttiva che prevede regole per alcuni attori dell’ecosistema delle valute virtuali (prevista la prima lettura in discussione plenaria per la fine di ottobre 2017), l’Italia ha anticipato alcune disposizioni di tale proposta, inserendo gli Exchanger quali soggetti destinatari delle normative antiriciclaggio.

Il  Decreto Legislativo 25 maggio 2017, n. 90 vede la luce dopo aver terminato il lungo iter di consultazioni, iniziato a Dicembre con quelle pubbliche e terminato con il parere del Parlamento.

Le nuove disposizioni sulle valute virtuali sono contenute in alcuni articoli e attraverso l’introduzione dell’obbligo di iscrizione in apposito registro da parte dei Cambiavalute Virtuali.

In particolare, l’art. 1 del D.Lgs. 231/2007 (come modificato dal D.Lgs. 90/2017) definisce:

ff) prestatori di servizi relativi all’utilizzo di valuta virtuale: ogni persona fisica o giuridica che fornisce a terzi, a titolo professionale, servizi funzionali all’utilizzo, allo scambio, alla conservazione di valuta virtuale e alla loro conversione da ovvero in valute aventi corso legale

qq) valuta virtuale: la rappresentazione digitale di valore, non emessa da una banca centrale o da un’autorità pubblica, non necessariamente collegata a una valuta avente corso legale, utilizzata come mezzo di scambio per l’acquisto di beni e servizi e trasferita, archiviata e negoziata elettronicamente.

L’articolo 5 del D.Lgs. 231/2007 (come modificato dal D.Lgs. 90/2017) sancisce le entità destinatarie degli obblighi della normativa Antiriciclaggio, suddividendo tali soggetti in cinque categorie, di cui definita relativa agli Operatori Non Finanziari (art.5.5):

i) i prestatori di servizi relativi all’utilizzo di valuta virtuale, limitatamente allo svolgimento dell’attività di conversione di valute virtuali da ovvero in valute aventi corso forzoso.

La normativa antiriciclaggio definisce quindi i “Prestatori di Servizi” (lett. ff) e la “Valuta Virtuale” (lett. qq), limitando poi gli obblighi antiriciclaggio agli Exchanger (inseriti negli operatori non finanziari), pur se la definizione adottata è chiaramente più ampia della Proposta Europea, mancando il termine “a titolo principale”.

Infatti, le due definizioni sono analoghe alla proposta (emendata) COM (2016) 450 della Commissione Europea e in particolare:

Exchanger: “g) prestatori di servizi la cui attività principale e professionale consiste nella fornitura di servizi di cambio tra valute virtuali e valute legali”.

Valute virtuali: “18) “valute virtuali”: una rappresentazione di valore digitale che non è né emessa da una banca centrale o da un ente pubblico né è legata a una valuta legalmente istituita, non possiede uno status giuridico di valuta o moneta, ma è accettata da persone fisiche e giuridiche come mezzo di scambio, ed eventualmente per altri fini, e può essere trasferita, memorizzata o scambiata elettronicamente.

Il testo emendato  della proposta della Commissione europea COM (2016) 450 prevede l’ottenimento ha richiesto una licenza o un’autorizzazione all’entità obbligata, proponendo la sostituzione dell’art. 47 della Direttiva UE 2015/859.

1. Gli Stati membri assicurano che i prestatori di servizi di cambio tra valute virtuali e valute legali, i prestatori di servizi di portafoglio digitale, i cambiavalute e gli uffici per l’incasso di assegni e i prestatori di servizi relativi a società o trust ottengano una licenza o siano registrati e che i prestatori di servizi di gioco d’azzardo siano regolamentati.”;

L’art. 8 del Decreto Legislativo 25 maggio 2017, n. 90 introduce due nuovi commi virgole nella legge dei cambiavalute, integrando la normativa prevista dal Decreto Legislativo 13 agosto 2010, n. 141, articolo 17-bis:

1. Al decreto legislativo 13 agosto 2010, n. 141, come modificato dal decreto legislativo 14 dicembre 2010, n. 218, e dal decreto legislativo 19 settembre 2012, n. 169, all’articolo 17-bis , dopo il comma 8, sono aggiunti i seguenti:

«8-bis. Le previsioni di cui al presente articolo si applicano, altresì, ai prestatori di servizi relativi all’utilizzo di valuta virtuale, come definiti nell’articolo 1, comma 2, lettera ff), del decreto legislativo 21 novembre 2007, n. 231, e successive modificazioni tenuti, in forza della presente disposizione, all’iscrizione in una sezione speciale del registro di cui al comma 1.

8-ter. Ai fini dell’efficiente popolamento della sezione speciale di cui al comma 8-bis, con decreto del Ministro dell’economia e delle finanze sono stabilite le modalità e la tempistica con cui i prestatori di servizi relativi all’utilizzo di valuta virtuale sono tenuti a comunicare al Ministero dell’economia e delle finanze la propria operatività sul territorio nazionale. La comunicazione costituisce condizione essenziale per l’esercizio legale dell’attività da parte dei suddetti prestatori. Con il decreto di cui al presente comma sono stabilite forme di cooperazione tra il Ministero dell’economia e delle finanze e le forze di polizia, idonee ad interdire l’erogazione dei servizi relativi all’utilizzo di valuta virtuale da parte dei prestatori che non ottemperino all’obbligo di comunicazione.»

L’Italia è il primo Stato membro europeo a introdurre regole sugli Exchanger introducendo una figura innovativa quale il Cambiavalute Virtuale, rimandando al Ministero dell’Economia l’emanazione di appositi decreti di applicazione, auspicando che in tali decreti tengano pienamente in considerazione la natura virtuale, decentralizzata e ubiqua di tali strumenti.

Stefano Capaccioli

@s_capaccioli